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H- l B VISA LEGISLATION:
LEGAL DEFICIENCIES
AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
Alaina M Beach
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the highest U.S. unemployment rate in over a decade,'
current federal law provides that 65,000 nonimmigrant workers, or
workers temporarily in the country to serve in a specialized occupation,
may be issued H-1B work visas in order to fill positions in the U.S.
each year. 2 This massive number does not include the additional H-lB
visas permitted to be issued for workers employed at "an institution of
higher education," a "nonprofit research organization or governmental
research organization," or for workers who have "earned a master's or
higher degree from a United States institution of higher education."
3
To hire H-1B workers, employers must undergo a specific certification
process, and after certification, they must adhere to employer
guidelines. 4 This paper first explores that process and its deficiencies,
with an emphasis on the practice of "bodyshopping" and its effect on
the H-1B program. It then examines the ways in which the Economic
Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the Neufeld Memo have altered
certification rules. Finally, this paper posits that better regulatory
methods are needed to prevent employers from abusing the H-1B visa
program.
1 Louis Uchitelle, Jobless Rate Hits 7.2% a 16-Year High, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/business/
economy/10jobs.html.
2 8 U.S.C.A. § 1184(g)(1)(A) (West 2009); see also John Miano, Center
for Immigration Studies, The Bottom of the Pay Scale: Wages for H-lB
Computer Programmers, BACKGROUNDERS AND REPORTS, Dec. 2005, at 2,
available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/backl305.pdf [hereinafter Miano,
Bottom of the Pay Scale].
' 8 U.S.C.A. § 11 84(g)(5) (West 2009).
4 Miano, Bottom of the Pay Scale], supra note 2, cited in Todd H.
Goodsell, On the Continued Need for H-lB Reform: A Partial, Statutory
Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. Workers, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 153, 160
(2007).
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I. THE H-1B PROGRAM
The H-lB program was designed to provide a means of
recruiting foreign specialty workers on a temporary basis, without
detracting from the employment of American citizens: "Congress's
intent ... consisted of a balancing of dual concerns: establishing a[n]
efficient immigration system which is responsive to labor needs while
simultaneously according [] protection to both domestic and alien
workers." 5 This program, which the Immigration Act of 1990 created,6
established a visa classification that applies to nonimmigrant aliens
"coming temporarily to the United States to perform services ... in a
specialty occupation." 7 A specialty occupation requires "theoretical
and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge,
' 8
such as technical expertise, nurse training, and teaching techniques.
9
The occupation must also require a bachelor's degree or higher "in the
specific specialty." 10
To hire an H-lB worker, an employer must gain certification.
The employment certification process begins when the potential
employer files the Labor Condition Application (LCA)" with the
Department of Labor at most six months before it intends to employ the
worker.12  The Department of Labor's Employment and Training
Administration (ETA) rejects "incomplete or obviously inaccurate
5 H. Rosemary Jeronimides, The H-IB Visa Category: A Tug of War, 7
GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 367, 374 (1993) (describing the "underlying congressional
intent" behind The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990). In establishing
the original temporary work visa, "Congress attempted to balance competing
concerns ... to facilitate the entry of foreign workers with special abilities and
skills who might prove beneficial to the American economy . . . [without]
interfer[ing] with the labor supply, wages, or working conditions of the United
States domestic work force." Id. at 368.
6 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, H-IB VISA PROGRAM: LABOR COULD IMPROVE ITS OVERSIGHT
AND INCREASE INFORMATION SHARING WITH HOMELAND SECURITY, GAO-06-
720 (2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
7 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 101(a)(15)(H) (West 2009); see Miano, Bottom of the Pay
Scale, supra note 2, at 2.
8 8 U.S.C.A. § 184(i)(1) (West 2009).
9 Miano, Bottom of the Pay Scale, supra note 2, at 10.
10 8 U.S.C.A. § 11 84(i)(1); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
" E.g., 20 C.F.R. § 655.700 (2008); GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 6; see
also Jeronimides, supra note 5, at 375.
12 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(b) (2008).
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LCAs."' 13 By submitting and signing the LCA, "the employer ...
attests the statements in the LCA are true and promises to comply with
the labor condition statements (attestations) specifically identified in
[the forms].,' 4  Filing the LCA commits the employer to paying H-1
visa-holders "the greater of the actual wage rate . . . or the prevailing
wage."' 15 The actual wage is the amount the employer pays all other
workers "with similar experience and qualifications for the specific
employment in question.",16 The prevailing wage is "the average wage
paid to similarly employed workers in the requested occupation in the
area of intended employment."' 17 By filing the LCA, the employer also
vows to ensure "that the employment of H-lB nonimmigrants will not
adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed
in the area of intended employment,"' 8 "that there is not at that time a
strike or lockout in the course of a labor dispute in the occupational
classification at the place of employment,"'19 and that "the employer has
provided notice . . . to the . . . employees in the occupational
classification in which the H-lB nonimmigrants will be employed.,
20
The employer must include specific details as to "the number of
workers sought, the occupational classification . . . , and [the] wage rate
and conditions.",
21
Employers that qualify as "H-iB-dependent employer[s]" and
employers found to have willfully violated H 1-B program requirements
commit themselves to additional attestations. 22 An H-lB-dependent
employer is "an employer that meets [certain] standards, which are
based on the [ratio] between the employer's total work force employed
in the U.S .... and the employer's H-lB nonimmigrant employees."
23
H-IB-dependent employers have more than fifteen percent of their
'" E.g., 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(b); GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
14 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(c)(2) (2008); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 6,
at6.
"5 20 C.F.R. § 655.73 1(a) (2009); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at
6.
16 20 C.F.R. § 655.73 1(a)(1) (2009).
17 U.S. Dep't of Labor Employment & Training Admin, Foreign Labor
Certification Prevailing Wages, (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.foreignlaborcert.
doleta.gov/wages.cfm; see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.731 (a)(2) (2009).
IS E.g., 20 C.F.R. § 655.732 (2008); GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
'9 20 C.F.R. § 655.733 (2008); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
20 20 C.F.R. § 655.734 (2008); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
21 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(n)(1)(D) (West 2008); see also GAO REPORT, supra
note 6, at 13.
22 E.g., 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(c)(2); GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
23 20 C.F.R. § 655.736(a)(1) (2006).
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workforce on visas.24 These employers and willful violators25 must
attest that, in seeking and hiring H-1B workers, these employers have
"not displace[d] U.S. workers from jobs . . .and that such employers
[have] recruit[ed] U.S. workers before hiring H-1B nonimmigrants. 26
An employer is held to a good faith standard in attempting to recruit
U.S. workers prior to hiring H-lB workers.
27
After the LCA has been approved, the employer must file the
LCA and an H-1B petition with United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) for each worker the employer intends to
hire.28 "[T]he nonimmigrant then may apply for an H-1B visa abroad
at a consular office of the Department of State." 29
III. REGULATION OF EMPLOYERS:
THE KEY PLAYERS AND PENALTIES
Authorities monitor active and applicant employers in the H-1B
program in several ways. The ETA may reject LCAs that are
incomplete or contain obvious mistakes. 30 The ETA may also reject H-
IB-dependent employers and past willful violators who do not meet the
supplemental required attestations on the LCA. 3 1  During petition
review (adjudication), Homeland Security makes sure the certified
LCA is included with the petition, "the employer is eligible to employ
an H-1B worker, [] the position is a specialty occupation, and [] the
prospective H-1B worker is qualified .... ,,32 The Department of
24 E.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 7; Patrick Thibodeau & Jaikumar
Vijayan, Stimulus Package Sets H - JB Limits; Leaves Out E-Verify Mandate,
COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 23, 2009, available at http://www.computerworld.com/
action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld=334451.
25 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(c)(2).
26 20 C.F.R. § 655.736 (2006); see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.738(e) (West
2010); GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
27 E.g., 20 C.F.R. § 655.739 (West 2010); Dep't of Labor, Office of
Compliance Assistance Policy, Sept. 2009, http://www.dol.gov/compliance/
guide/h lb.htm [hereinafter Dep't of Labor, Office of Compliance Assistance
Policy]; GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
28 E.g., 20 C.F.R. § 655.700(b)(2) (2008), GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at
7-10.
2' 20 C.F.R. § 655.700(b)(3) (2008) ("If the nonimmigrant is already in the
United States in a status other than H-IB, he/she may apply to the DHS for a
change of visa status.").
3 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(b).
3' 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(c)(2).
32 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 8.
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Homeland Security may reject petitions that fail to meet any of these
requirements.33 After these initial application and petition processes,
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor may
investigate employers in practice if there is "reasonable cause to
believe [the] employer did not comply or misrepresented information
on its application. 34  This reasonable belief usually stems from
complaints by "H-lB workers or certain others with knowledge of [the]
employer's practices." 35  Additionally, the Labor Department may
conduct random investigations of past willful violators.36 A final
method of enforcement stems from complaints by American citizens to
the Justice Department's Office of Special Counsel for Immigration
Related Unfair Employment Practices.37 This department investigates
"charges of citizenship discrimination brought by U.S. workers who
allege that an employer preferred to hire an H-1B worker" over an
American citizen.
Aside from denial of H-1B employer status, penalties vary for
violations of H-1B program rules. 39 The Administrator of the ETA,
who performs "all of the Secretary's investigative and enforcement
40functions" as they pertain to the Labor Condition Application, may
assign penalties including fines "of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment
of up to five years for knowing and willful submission of false
statements ....,,41 Additionally, failure to pay required wages or
provide adequate working conditions may result in ordered "payment
of back wages (including benefits)," regardless of whether the violation
was willful. 42 Other penalties include fines capped at "$1000 for each
affected person" (subject to the Administrator's discretion),43
"disqualification from approval of petitions," and "other administrative
remedies as the Administrator determines to be appropriate."
44
Additionally, the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related
Unfair Employment Practices may "investigate charges of immigration-
331d.
34 Id.
35 E.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 18; Jeronimides, supra note 5, at
376.
36 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 18.371 Id. at 8.38 id.
31 See id. at 17.
40 20 C.F.R. § 655.800 (2006).
41 20 C.F.R. § 655.805(a).
42 20 C.F.R. § 655.805(b); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 8.
4' 20 C.F.R. § 655.410(a) (2009).
44 20 C.F.R. § 655.810 (2006).
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related unfair employment practices" and file a complaint in connection
therewith. 45 The penalties for violations found through these types of
complaints are left to the discretion of "specially designated
administrative law judges within the Office of the Chief Administrative
Hearing Officer [of the] U.S. Department of Justice.
4 6
IV. ENFORCEMENT METHODS: INEFFECTIVE CHECK ON ABUSES
Despite its systematic and organized appearance, the H-1B
program is ineffective at preventing and properly penalizing abuses.47
Employers may manipulate the hiring procedure to obtain cheap,
dependable labor at the expense of American job seekers. The first
opportunity for abuse arises when the employer fills out the LCA.
A. LCA APPROVAL PROCESS
The LCA data is evaluated on its face; as long as the information
does not raise suspicions and meets the general requirements, it passes
muster. 8 Therefore, the employer has the ability to dodge suspicion by
meeting the minimum criteria, at which point the chance of being
questioned is very lOW.49 The "incomplete or obvious inaccuracies"
threshold50 is a very low standard:
Labor has defined obvious inaccuracies as when an
employer.., states a wage rate that is below the Fair
Labor Standards Act minimum wage; [ ] identifies a
wage rate that is below the prevailing wage on the
application; and [ ] identifies a wage range where the
bottom of the range is lower than the prevailing wage
on the application.5'
Although regulations provide guidance to potential employer-
applicants when filling out the LCA, these regulations do not mandate
close investigation by the Labor Department.5  The prevailing wage "is
4' 28 C.F.R. § 0.53(b)(1) (1997); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at
25.
46 28 C.F.R. § 0.53(b)(1).
47 See Miano, Bottom of the Pay Scale, supra note 2, at I.
48 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
49 See id, at 23.
'0 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(b); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 26.
5' GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 14.
52 20 C.F.R. § 655.731 (2009).
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usually obtained by contacting the State Workforce Agency (SWA)
having jurisdiction over the geographic area of intended employment or
from other legitimate sources of information., 53 Although the recently-
implemented "iCert program" provides guidance to applicants by way
of a "Prevailing Wage Quick Start Guide ' 54 and a more comprehensive
"Prevailing Wage User Guide," 55 the validity of the resulting prevailing
wage depends on more than just appropriate estimation by the source of
information consulted for wage approximations; the validity also
depends on the accuracy of the employer's employment description.
5 6
If the employer provides an occupational classification that meets the
requirements of a specialty occupation simply for purposes of obtaining
an H-1B visa but intends to assign more responsibilities to the worker
than those admitted on the LCA, then the assigned wage minimum
noted by the Labor Department may be inappropriate for that worker.
5 7
Further, although the employer must maintain documentation
supporting "the validity of the wage statement," the employer need
53 U.S. Dep't of Labor Employment & Training Admin., Foreign Labor
Certification Prevailing Wages, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.foreignlaborcert.
doleta.gov/wages.cfm; see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a)(2); see also
Jeronimides, supra note 5, at 383-88 (explaining the evolution of H-lB
regulations, where initially The Technical Immigration and Naturalization
Amendment of 1991 set out to allow flexibility in wage determinations and to
"eliminate the rigidity," and subsequent corresponding regulations provided
"prevailing wage sources in order of priority," diminishing the originally
desired flexibility).
54 EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN. PERFORMANCE AND TECH. OFFICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, iCERT PREVAILING WAGE QUICK START GUIDE FOR
EXTERNAL USERS, http://icert.doleta.gov/library/userguides/iCERT-
Prevailing WageQuickStartGuide.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2010)
[hereinafter iCERT PREVAILING WAGE QUICK START GUIDE FOR EXTERNAL
USERS].
55 EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN. PERFORMANCE AND TECH. OFFICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, iCERT LCA MODULE ONLINE SYSTEM EXTERNAL USER
GUIDE, VERSION 1.0, AILA INFONET Doc. No. 09041064 (2009),
http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=28587&linkid=1 99300.
56 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.731.57See John Miano, Former President, Programmers Guild, Testimony
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H.
Judiciary Comm. 109th Cong. 6-7, 10 (2006), available at
http://www.aila.us/content/default.aspx?docid= 18964 [hereinafter Miano,
Testimony], cited in Todd H. Goodsell, On the Continued Need for H-lB
Reform: A Partial, Statutory Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. Workers,
21 BYU J. PUB. L. 153, 165 (2007); see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.731; Goodsell,
supra note 4, at 162-63.
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only present such documentation to the Department of Labor upon
request.58
In practice, H-IB wages consistently fall below the wages of
U.S. workers. 59 John Miano, who founded the Programmers Guild, "a
union for computer programmers," 60  has alleged that "the
overwhelming majority of H-iB workers are actually paid wages
substantially lower than Americans in equivalent positions."
61
Consequently, "the LCA system has been nothing more than a paper-
shuffling process.
62
However, in April of 2009, the DOL unveiled the new iCert
program, which was intended to help the DOL in "tightening its review
of applications for H-lB visas." 63  The program has shifted the
previously online system toward a system involving manual processing
of applications. Previously, an LCA was "approved within seconds of
submission. With the implementation of iCert, for the first time DOL
staffers . . . manually process LCAs to ensure thorough scrutiny of the
application, resulting in approval times of at least 5 to 7 business
days." 64  Further, now "the employer must specify the number of
workers to be classified as new employment., 65 The additional fields,
added time, and manual review involved in filing and processing LCAs
through iCert is at least a step in the right direction with regard to
preventing the certification of so many LCAs that contain errors.
66
5820 C.F.R. § 655.731(b)(1).
59 Goodsell, supra note 57, at 165.60Id. at 161.
61 Miano, Testimony, supra note 57, at 34.
62 Miano, Bottom of the Pay Scale, supra note 2, at 4.
63 Posting of Kellie N. Lego to The H-1B Visa Lawyer's Blog, 2009 -
The Year of Immigration Compliance, http://www.hlbvisalawyerblog.com/
2009/03/2009_the year of imnigrationc.html (Mar. 18, 2009); see also
Regulatory Information: NAFSA's iCERT Resource Page,
http://www.nafsa.org/regulatory information.sec/the icertjportalsystem/ (last
visited Feb. 26, 2010) [hereinafter NAFSA'S iCERT Resource Page].
64 Lego, supra note 63.
65 New DOL System iCERT for Hi B LCAs,
http://www.hlbvisalawyerblog.com/2009/03/2009 thejyear of immigration_c
.html (Mar. 30, 2009); see iCERT PREVAILING WAGE QUICK START GUIDE FOR
EXTERNAL USERS, supra note 54.66 See NAFSA's iCERT Resource Page, supra note 63.
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B. COMPLAINT-BASED ENFORCEMENT
Post-certification procedures fail to sufficiently police workplace
activity and protect H-iB workers. 6 7 Because the application review
process fails to adequately monitor potential abuses, enforcement of the
H-1B program's rules and guidelines stems largely from complaints by
H-lB workers themselves or by others.68 Nevertheless, while an H-lB
worker or third party may file a complaint, 69 in practice it is rare for
either party to execute this step. 70 H-lB workers who realize that they
are not being treated properly are often hesitant to complain out of fear
of being penalized by employers or ultimately losing their visas
entirely.71 To employers, this behavior may seem like "remarkable
loyalty, '72 but this perception masks the true reason for such committed
employment relationships: "Since an H-1B is typically in no position to
seek other employment, the employer need not worry that the worker
will suddenly leave . .. in the middle of a pressing project., 73 In
practice, therefore, these H-lB workers are relegated to a role of "de
facto indentured servitude., 74 Additionally, because holding an H-1B
work visa does not prevent an alien from later obtaining a green card,
an H-lB worker's reluctance to complain may result from hope for or
dependence on the employer's sponsorship of the worker's permanent
residency down the road.75
67 See Miano, Testimony, supra note 57, at 10-11, cited in Goodsell, supra
note 57, at 165.
68 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.710 (2006); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at
16.
69 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
70 See Norman Matloff, On the Need for Reform of the H-B Non-
Immigrant Work Visa in Computer-Related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 815, 910 (2003); see also Ron Hira, EPI Briefing Paper #187:
Outsourcing America's Technology and Knowledge Jobs, ECONOMIC POLICY
INSTITUTE, at 4, Mar. 28, 2007, available at http://www.sharedprosperity.
org/bp1 87/bp 187.pdf [hereinafter Hira, Outsourcing America's Technology].
71 Hira, Outsourcing America's Technology, supra note 70, at 4.
72 Matloff, supra note 70, at 817.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE RANKING MINORITY
MEMBER, SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG, POLICY, AND HUMAN
RESOURCES, COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, H. OF REP., BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED
TO HELP EMPLOYERS AND PROTECT WORKERS, GAO/HEHS-00-157, 22 (2000)
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00157.pdf; see also
Jeronimides, supra note 5, at 378-79 (describing the relationship between
temporary workers and temporary workers seeking permanent residence).
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Although several protections exist for H-1B workers who
complain about employers' actions, these protections are vague and
ineffective at encouraging H-lB workers to file complaints when
applicable.76  Statutory whistleblower protections mandate that
employers may not "intimidate, threaten, restrain, coerce, blacklist,
discharge, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee"
based on the employee's disclosure of information to authorities."
Another statutory protection provides the opportunity for an H-1B
worker who has complained to seek other employment during the
remaining H-1B period without penalty of losing H-1B status.
78
Further, if the H-1B worker somehow loses visa status while "fac[ing]
retaliatory action from his or her employer[,] ... USCIS adjudicators
may consider [this result] an 'extraordinary circumstance' as defined by
8 CFR 214.1(c)(4)" and may reinstitute the H-1B visa.79
Unfortunately, the decision of whether to apply these protections is in
the discretion of USCIS.
80
When a third party complains that an employer's behavior
violates Hi-B or certification guidelines, subsequent investigation
occurs only if the complaint provides "reasonable cause to believe that
the employer has committed a violation," and that either "the violation
is willful," meaning it reflects a pattern of that type of behavior, or "the
employer has committed substantial violations, affecting multiple
employees." 8' It is only after the complaint has met these criteria and
the Secretary has approved the prospective investigation that "an
investigation should be commenced by the Administrator." 82  An
American citizen-employee may also complain upon cause to believe
that the employer has discriminated against the employee by
"preferr[ing] to hire an H-1B worker."8 3 In such a case, the Justice
76 Hira, Outsourcing America's Technology, supra note 70, at 4.
" 8 U.S.C.A. § 182(n)(2)(C)(iv) (West 2008).
78 8 U.S.C.A. § 11 82(n)(2)(C)(v) (West 2008).
79 Donald Neufeld, Memorandum (U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv.
May 30, 2008) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(c)(4) (2009)), available at
http://www.h Iblegalrights.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/termination-
retaliation-extraordinary-circumstance.pdf.
80 Will I Be Deported If I Complain Against My H-lB Employer?,
http://www.h lblegalrights.com/?p=33 (Nov. 26, 2008, 04:56 EST).
s' 20 C.F.R. § 655.807(d) (2006).
82 20 C.F.R. § 655.807(g) (2006).
83 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 8; see also 20 C.F.R. § 501.3(b) (2008).
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Department has discretion to investigate.84  The charges may be
dismissed for lack of reasonable cause.85
C. RANDOM INVESTIGATIONS OF WILLFUL VIOLATORS
An additional, minimal check on H-lB employers comes with
the Department of Labor's authority to randomly investigate employers
who have been deemed willful violators within the past five years.86
However, employers subject to this authority represent a small
percentage of H-1B employers in general.8 7 The process does not
target employers who are not yet identified as violators, and this group
constitutes the bulk of the employer class.
88
D. EFFECT
Because few means of H-lB rule enforcement exist, it is crucial
for H-1B workers and third parties to utilize the complaint system.89
When H-1B workers fear that filing complaints may detrimentally
impact their citizenship status or work conditions, their decisions not to
file indirectly affect American workers;90 these Americans may not
appeal to employers whose H-1B workers accept small wages out of
fear.
Ron Hira, a well-known expert on outsourcing issues,
9 1
explained the rarity of investigations of certified employers and the
work conditions these employers provide for their H-lB workers:
H-1B employers are never scrutinized except in the
rare case that an investigation is triggered by an H-lB
worker whistleblower. When investigated, violations
84 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
85 id.
86 Fact Sheet # 62S: What Is a Willful Violator Employer? (Dep't of
Labor July 2008), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/FactSheet62/
whdfs62S.pdf [hereinafter Dep't of Labor, Fact Sheet].
87 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 19. Although the number of cases is
small, "cases with willful violations ... have increased from 8 percent in fiscal
year 2000 to 14 percent in fiscal year 2005. Id. at 24.
s id.
89 See Hira, Outsourcing America's Technology, supra note 70.
90 Id.
91 Bio for Ron Hira, P.H.D., P.E., http://www.uscc.gov/bios/2005bios/
05 01 13bios/hiraron.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).
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of the H-1B program are found in more than 80% of
the cases, a much higher percentage than other
programs. The most common violations found were
instances where employers did not pay H-lB workers
what they were legally required. So, even when
employers attest to pay a particular wage, they have
little worry that anyone might audit them to ensure
that actual wages match the wages on the
applications.92
Hira further notes, "With cases against employers often taking
five or more years to adjudicate, it is no wonder that few violations are
ever brought to the attention of the DOL. 93  Rather than pursue a
complaint whose favorable end the worker may never see, the H-1B
worker often finds silent endurance the more attractive option.94 Thus,
the complaint system, in its current state, fails to offer reliable
regulation.
Because the Department of Labor only randomly investigates
employers previously adjudged as willful violators, 95 undetected
violator-employers are generally secure and need only fear complaints,
which are rarely, if ever, filed.96  Although USCIS has recently
attempted to increase oversight of the H-lB program, 97 much
improvement is still needed.98 The bottom line is that the abuses are
not disappearing: "[Slerious violations of the H-lB program by
employers are so common that one in five visas are affected by either
fraud or 'technical violations.' This means that potentially thousands
of employers may be violating the rules, some willfully."
99
92 Hira, Outsourcing America's Technology, supra note 70.
93 id.
94 Id.
95 Dep't of Labor, Fact Sheet, supra note 86.
96 Hira, Outsourcing America's Technology, supra note 70.
97 Lego, supra note 63.
98 See Hira, Outsourcing America 's Technology, supra note 70.
99 Patrick Thibodeau, Widespread Problems, Fraud Found in H-lB
Program, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.computerworld.com/
action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld=9116758.
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V. H- l B "BODYSHOPS"
When employers in need of specialized workers struggle to find
affordable talent, third party companies known as "bodyshops" or
"outsourcing firms" often solve this problem to the detriment of
American workers. 100 Bodyshops submit paperwork for certification
before real work assignments exist and "bring H-lB visa workers into
the country and then contract [them] out to other companies on a work-
for-hire basis."' 0'1 The hired H-lB workers then focus on projects for
the end employer, which "allows the [end] employer to say it never
hired any H-lB workers."' 102 Bodyshops profit by charging the end
company more than they pay the H-iB workers. 10 3 The phenomenon
of bodyshopping further deters employers from whole-heartedly
attempting to fill positions with American workers; not only can these
employers utilize cheaper immigrant labor, but they can also do so
without jumping through the hoops associated with certification. 10 4 Of
the multiple ways parties abuse the H-iB system, the practice of
bodyshopping is likely the most serious offense.
If the intent behind the H-iB program is to provide American
employers with regulated access to highly-specialized international
workers on a temporary basis,'0 5 bodyshopping thwarts this function
completely. 10 6 In addition to deceiving officials who oversee the H-1B
visa program, because only limited visas are available, bodyshopping
precludes "other workers who would potentially provide needed skills
to the U.S. economy [from] obtain[ing] visas."'1 7 Further, bodyshops
are typically "H-iB-dependent" employers because a high percentage
of workers have H-lB visas. 10 8 It is unlikely, however, that they recruit
in a manner that is consistent with the certification attestation regarding
seeking American employees as a first resort. 10 9 Bodyshops often
merely "sponsor workers without actual assignments and then
100 Miano, Testimony, supra note 57, at 18.
101 Goodsell, supra note 57, at 156.
02 Id. at 168 (citing Miano, Testimony, supra note 57).
103 See Miano, Testimony, supra note 57, at 18-19.
104 id.
105 Jeronimides, supra note 5.
106 Hira, Outsourcing America 's Technology, supra note 70, at 3.
107 Goodsell, supra note 57, at 169.
108 20 C.F.R. § 655.736; see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.738(e); GAO REPORT,
supra note 6, at 7.
'09 20 C.F.R. § 655.736.
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'circulate lists of available H-IB workers to employers. '""' 0 As John
Miano described before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims, "Hotlists are lists with resumes of H-IB workers
already in the United States who do not have work. Companies
exchange hotlists so those with available H-iB workers can subcontract
them to other companies that will rent out the workers."''1 Even if the
end employer has attempted to recruit Americans before resorting to
the bodyshop's assistance, the bodyshop, which is the H-lB employer
according to certification documents, has not met the statutorily-
mandated attestation of recruiting U.S. workers." l2 By manipulating a
statutory loophole" 3 to their benefit, bodyshops outsource jobs to
foreigners who, by virtue of the H-lB program, are stationed in
America-"essentially onshore offshoring."' 14 Miano, using 2005 LCA
data, estimated "that more than two thirds of the workers in computer
programming occupations are going to employers in the offshoring and
bodyshopping industries."' 5 The labor is cheap and easy to obtain.
Naturally, employers choose the cheapest hiring technique, sometimes
without fully understanding the manner in which this hiring technique
violates H-lB visa policy. Without effective monitoring and
penalization, the practice of bodyshopping will continue to thrive and
defeat the intent of the H-1B visa program.
VI. CHANGES IN THE H- lB PROGRAM
There have been several recent changes to the H-lB Visa
program. On January 6, 2009, Congress introduced Section 1611 of the
Economic Recovery and Reinvestment Act, subtitled "Employ
American Workers Act," with the stated objective of helping
Americans counteract the rise in unemployment rates."16  This
legislation imposes specific requirements on certain types of employers
wishing to hire non-citizen workers, including H-lB workers. For
110 Goodsell, supra note 57, at 168.
Miano, Testimony, supra note 57, at 5.
112 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.736; see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.738(e); GAO
REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.113 Thibodeau & Vijayan, supra note 24.
114 Ed Frauenheim, Waging Battle of Foreign Labor, CNET NEWS.COM,
Oct. 6, 2005, available at http://news.cnet.com/Waging-battle-on-foreign-
labor/2009-1022_3-5888772.html.
115 Miano, Testimony, supra note 57, at 9.
116 Economic Recovery and Reinvestment Plan, § 1611 (b)(1), Jan. 6,
2009, 191, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=l I 1_congbills&docid=f:h lenr.pdf.
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example, the legislation imposes "additional requirements for
employers who receive funds through the Troubled Asset Relief
Program [TARP] or under Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act
(covered funding) before they may hire a foreign national to work in
the H-1B specialty occupation category."'1 7  Qualifying financial
institutions' 1 8 must now follow the new/extended process, which
requires that they adhere to the same heightened attestation standards
previously required of only H-1B-dependent employers. 119 Although
the changes make it more difficult and expensive for affected
companies to hire H-lB workers directly and will likely provide some
assistance to Americans looking for employment directly within those
companies, 120 the legislation does not address the biggest abuse to the
H-lB system: bodyshopping. For example, as Ron Hira notes, "many
TARP recipients have 'huge shadow workforces' at outsourcing
vendors .... Restricting H-lB hiring. . . 'doesn't close the loopholes
where most of the abuse occurs.' ' 121 The H-lB section of the Employ
American Workers Act has many other weaknesses, including
embracing the H-1B-dependent employer attestation standard, which is
difficult to enforce. A qualifying employer must attest that it has made
a "good faith" effort to recruit an American worker. 22 Proving a lack
117 USCIS Announces New Requirements for Hiring H-1B Foreign
Workers (U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv. 2009)
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f6141765
43f6dl aI?vgnextoid=34dd9b5d824202 I 0VgnVCM 1000004718190aRCRD&v
gnextchannel=68439c7755cb901OVgnVCM10000045f3d6alRCRD.
118 The Emergency Economic Stablization Act of 2008 defines "financial
institution" as:
any institution, including, but not limited to, any bank,
savings association, credit union, security broker or dealer,
or insurance company, established and regulated under the
laws of the United States or any State, territory, or
possession of the United States, the District of Columbia,
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Commonwealth of
Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, or the
United States Virgin Islands, and having significant
operations in the United States, but excluding any central
bank of, or institution owned by, a foreign government.
12 U.S.C.A. § 5202(5).
119 Economic Recovery and Reinvestment Plan, supra note 116.
120 id.
121 Thibodeau & Vijayan, supra note 24.
122 Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Stimulus Package Makes it Harder to Hire
H-1B Workers, INFORMATION WEEK, February 18, 2009, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/news/global-cio/h 1 b/showArticle.jhtml?
articlelD=214500968&cid=nl_IWK dailyH.
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of good faith, however, is problematic. Bloggers in the IT industry
have commented on this very problem, explaining how employers
dodge their "good faith" obligations. One Human Resources
representative expressed his concerns anonymously:
[E]mployers routinely get around that requirement by
running fraudulent job ads and conducting bad faith
interviews of qualified American workers and then
simply rejecting all American applicants . . . I have
over ten years [of] experience in corporate Human
Resources departments and technical recruiting
operations, and I have actually seen these tactics
used. Many HR reps are aware of these tactics but do
not speak out in public for fear of losing their careers
also. 23
It is difficult to prove that an employer did not recruit U.S.
workers in good faith because the inquiry is fact-intensive and
somewhat subjective. Thus, the standard provides another way for an
employer who desires to hire H-1B workers to manipulate the
system. 124
The Employ American Workers Act's provisions affecting the
financial services sector will not likely reduce participation in the H-1B
visa program as a whole: 1
25
It's estimated that in the financial services and
banking sector, less than 1% of workers have H-1B
visas . . . So while the new provisions will make it
more burdensome for financial services and banks
that have received federal bailouts to hire H-1B visa
workers, the new rules themselves aren't likely to
make [a] sizable dent in the overall demand for H-1B
visas ... The United States currently grants petitions
for up to 85,000 new H-1B visas annually.
126
123 Posting of HR Representative to IT BUSINESs EDGE, H-lB Visa
Proposal: 'Unintended Consequences' All Around,
http://www.itbusinessedge.com/cm/blogs/all/h- Ib-visa-proposal-unintended-
consequences-all-around/?cs= 10104 (Apr. 9, 2007, 06:54).
124 Ron Hira explained the absence of a "labor market test" that would
prove a regular H-1B employer had first recruited American workers before
hiring the H-I B worker. Hira, Outsourcing America's Technology, supra note
70, at 2-3.
125 Thibodeau & Vijayan, supra note 24.
126 McGee, supra note 122.
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In fact, even within the financial services sector, bodyshopping
remains an avenue incentivizing employers to deal with immigrant
employees only indirectly:
Most of the H-1B use, and abuse, happens through
relationships banks have with outsourcing firms...
[the amendment does not] restrict[] them from
working with those firms . . . a bank could still
legally force a laid-off American employee to train a
replacement worker who is on an H-1B visa.'27
Ironically, the H-1B program might generally push specialty
employment offshore rather than boosting it in this country: "Rather
than preventing the outsourcing of jobs, the H-1B program . . .
accelerat[es] the outsourcing of high-wage, high-skill jobs to low-cost
countries. The largest users of the H-1B program are offshore
outsourcing firms, whose business model depends on moving as much
work overseas as possible."' 128 These firms thrive by facilitating H-1B
workers' acquisition of high-level skills onsite and subsequent return to
their native countries, where the workers may then assist clients
cheaply and effectively.'
29
On the other hand, HI-B visa requirements may compel
employers to outsource while avoiding the red tape of the visas
altogether:
Why go through the expense - including not just the
visa fees but also the legal fees needed to process the
visas, the time it takes to get new employees trained
and up and running, plus the uncertainty, delays, and
lack of permanency of investments you may have
made in hiring foreign workers - when you can just
contract a company outside our borders and still get
most of the benefits of having the best and the
brightest working for you?
30
127 Eric Krangel, Anti-Immigrant Worker Bill Won't Stop H-IB Abuse,
THE BUSINESS INSIDER, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/
2009/2/bill-blocking-h- l b-hires-for-tarp-takers-wont-stop-h- l b-abuse.
128 Hira, Outsourcing America's Technology, supra note 70, at 2.
129 Id. at 5-6.
130 Ephraim Schwartz, Green-card Regulations Encourage Off-shoring,
INFOWORLD, Mar. 29, 2005, http://www.infoworld.com/
article/05/03/29/14OPrealityl .html.
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Hira expressed his opinion on the outsourcing problems
associated with the H-lB program in an article discussing the effect of
this new Economic Recovery Plan on American engineers: "The
Obama Administration has been in office just a few weeks now, but we
already know how it will address the offshoring of engineering jobs. It
will promote it. ' 31  By continuing to support a system in which
loopholes exist and agencies fail to regulate all offenses, the
government perpetuates these violations and thus makes outsourcing a
more attractive option to employers seeking cheap labor.1
32
Fortunately, more recent developments mark a step in the right
direction of reducing the impact of bodyshops. On January 8, 2010,
Donald Neufeld published a memorandum offering "guidance to
adjudication officers to clarify what constitutes a valid employer-
employee relationship to qualify for the H-lB 'specialty occupation'
classification."' 33 This memorandum acknowledges the ambiguity that
may lead to H-lB visa confusion: "The lack of guidance clearly
defining what constitutes a valid employer-employee relationship as
required by 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(4)(ii) has raised problems, in particular,
with ... beneficiaries placed at third-party worksites.' ' 134 The memo
states, "Petitioner [i.e., the bodyshop-employer] control over the [visa]
beneficiary must be established when the beneficiary is placed into
another employer's business, and expected to become a part of that
business's regular operations."'1 35 The 2010 Neufeld memorandum
131 Ron Hira, Opinion: The Obama Administration Promotes Outsourcing,
EE TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at 1, http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.
jhtmljsessionid=YI2IUHT 1TPPH4QSNDLQSKHSCJUNN2JVN?articlelD=2
13001145.
132 Id.
133 Questions and Answers: USCIS Issues Guidance Memorandum on
Establishing the "Employee-Employer Relationship" in H-lB Petitions (U.S.
Citizenship and Immigr. Serv.), Jan. 13, 2010, (citing Memorandum from
Donald Neufeld USCIS Assoc. Director to USCIS Service Center Directors
(Jan. 8, 2010)), http://www.uscis.gov (follow "NEWS" hyperlink; then January
2010 "Questions and Answers: USCIS Issues Guidance Memorandum on
Establishing the 'Employer-Employee Relationship' in H-1B Petitions"
hyperlink) [hereinafter U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Serv.].
134 Memorandum from Donald Neufeld USCIS Associate Director to
USCIS Service Center Directors, Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/
Laws/Memoranda/20 10/H I B%20Employer-Employee%20Memo0 1081 0.pdf
[hereinafter Neufeld, 2010 Memorandum]
135 Id.
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specifically designates bodyshops as examples of employment that
"would not present a valid employer-employee relationship":136
Third Party Placement / "Job Shop"
The petitioner is a computer consulting company.
The petitioner has contracts with numerous outside
companies in which it supplies these companies with
employees to fulfill specific staffing needs. The
specific positions are not outlined in the contract
between the petitioner and the third-party company
but are staffed on an as-needed basis. The
beneficiary is a computer analyst. The beneficiary
has been assigned to work for the third-party
company to fill a core position to maintain the third-
party company's payroll. Once placed at the client
company, the beneficiary reports to a manager who
works for the third-party company. [He] does not
report to the petitioner for work assignments, and all
work assignments are determined by the third-party
company. The petitioner does not control how the
beneficiary will complete daily tasks, and no
propriet[ary] information of the petitioner is used by
the beneficiary to complete any work assignments.
The beneficiary's end-product, the payroll, is not in
any way related to the petitioner's line of business,
which is computer consulting. The beneficiary's
progress reviews are completed by the client
company, not the petitioner.
[Petitioner Has no Right to Control; No Exercise
of Control] 13
7
To determine whether a valid "employer-employee relationship"
exists, USCIS evaluates "whether the petitioner has the 'right to
control' the beneficiary's employment." 138 The memo further provides
that USCIS may request evidence upon belief "that the petitioner has
failed to establish eligibility for the benefit sought, including in cases
where the petitioner has failed to establish that a valid employer-
employee relationship exists and will continue to exist throughout the
duration of the beneficiary's employment term with the employer."
'1 39
136 Id. at 5.
131 Id. at 6-7.
138 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Serv., supra note 133.
39 Neufeld, 2010 Memorandum, supra note 134, at 10.
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Employers may submit documentation as evidence that the proper
relationship has been maintained; additionally, examples of relevant
documentation are outlined in the memo. 140 Upon receipt of such
evidence, "[a]djudicators will review and weigh all the evidence
submitted to determine whether a qualifying employer-employee
relationship has been established."'
14 1
The 2010 Neufeld memorandum certainly makes employers
aware that USCIS does not intend to ignore abuses any longer.
However, the memo limits its applicability to "solely for the training
and guidance of USCIS personnel" by stating that it "may not be relied
upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or by any individual or other party in removal
proceedings, in litigation with the United States, or in any other form or
manner." 142  Despite this language, the memo "revises the
Adjudicator's Field Manual, which is binding on adjudicators pursuant
to AFM Section 3.4." 143 Accordingly, the memo has been challenged
as a potential violation of the Administrative Procedures Act through
failure to abide by proper "notice and comment requirements.'"
44
However, according to USC1S, the memo does not alter the law with
regard to H-iB petitions: "The H-iB regulations currently require that
a United States employer establish that it has an employer-employee
relations[hip] with respect to the beneficiary, as indicated by the fact
that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise or otherwise control the work of
such employee." 145 Despite the claims of failed adherence to proper
notice and comment requirements, deportations based on the Neufeld
memo have already begun. 146 Challenges to the memo's validity are
likely to continue.
140 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Serv., supra note 133. These examples
include but are not limited to "a complete itinerary of services or
engagements," copies of signed Employment Agreements and contracts, and
copies of position descriptions. Neufeld, 2010 Memorandum, supra note 134,
at 8.
141 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Serv., supra note 133.
142 Neufeld, 2010 Memorandum, supra note 134, at 10-11.
"' AILA-USCIS HQ Liaison Committee, American Immigration Lawyers
Association (AILA), Letter to Roxana Bacon, Chief Counsel of the U.S.
Citizenship & Immigr. Serv. (January 26, 2010) 1-2,
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/23690947/AILA-Letter-on-Neufeld-Memo-of-
Jan-2010.
4 id.
145 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Serv., supra note 133.
146 See Jacob Cherian, Deportation of H-lB Visa Workers at Newark,
JFK-New Face of Outsourcing, GROUND REPORT, Jan. 31, 2010,
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VII. CONSIDERED CHANGES TO THE H-I B PROGRAM
A. TAKE PROPER STEPS TO CHANGE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Changing H-lB statutory language may help further the goals of
USCIS and eliminate abuse. At present, the L-1 visa program
141
contains legislation forbidding bodyshops:
(F) An alien who will serve in a capacity involving
specialized knowledge with respect to an employer
for purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L) and will be
stationed primarily at the worksite of an employer
other than the petitioning employer or its affiliate,
subsidiary, or parent shall not be eligible for
classification under section 101 (a)(15)(L) if--
(i) the alien will be controlled and supervised
principally by such unaffiliated employer; or
(ii) the placement of the alien at the worksite of the
unaffiliated employer is essentially an arrangement to
provide labor for hire for the unaffiliated employer,
rather than a placement in connection with the
provision of a product or service for which
specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning
employer is necessary. 1
48
Thus, workers entering the United States on an L-1 visa must
remain employed by the sponsoring company and cannot be contracted
out to other companies.149 With the addition of this language, Congress
eliminated the L-1 bodyshopping loophole. 150 If the H-1B program
could be amended to similarly prohibit bodyshops, this legislation
would help eliminate any uncertainty as to the permissibility of
http://www.groundreport.com/Business/Deportation-of-H-IB-Visa-Workers-at-
Newark-JFK-New/2916904.
147 The L-1 visa "requires the visa applicant to be a current employee of
the sponsoring company." This "visa allows a foreign worker employed by an
overseas company to enter the country for one year, 'in order to continue to
render his services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a
capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge."'
Goodsell, supra note 57, at 170 (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 101(a)(15)(L) (2006)).
148 Goodsell, supra note 57, at 170-71 (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1184(c)(2)(F)
(West 2004)).
149 id.
150 Id.
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bodyshopping.151 However, the L-1 program accounts for a much
smaller portion of work visas than does the H-l B program.152 Based on
the magnitude of the H-1B program, enforcing the legislation would
require extensive monitoring of employers and their worksites. 153 So
far, this monitoring is not a common practice.'
54
Ideally, the Neufeld memo and future, properly-implemented H-
1B statutory changes would result in a realistically-priced labor
standard. These adjustments could cause employers to stop exploiting
the sometimes desperate H-1B visa holders, whose motivations for
accepting low pay and long hours may go unnoticed or be completely
unknown to the end employer.' 55 Despite the ways in which such
changes may disrupt American businesses that rely on third party labor,
ultimately, such a restriction on H-1B employment should wean
American businesses of this source of cheap labor and encourage them
to reinvest in U.S. workers and in specialty education.
156
B. INCREASED OVERSIGHT
Although the LCA review and certification process likely has
improved by way of iCert so that the process will no longer amount to
"simply a 'rubber stamp' of the employer's application,"' 57 iCert will
not eliminate abuse by employers. The largest and most severe abuses
may occur onsite, where H-1B workers may be undercompensated by
extreme hours or low wages.' 58  Therefore, it is necessary for
enforcement agencies to initiate more in-person checks of H-1B work
locations and to monitor H-1 B workers' paychecks and the hours they
actually work. A recent crackdown on H-1B program abuse suggests
that officials focus predominantly on initial filings rather than post-
certification practices in looking for signs of violations. 59 The charges
151 Id.
152 Id. at 170.
153 See Goodsell, supra note 57, at 170.
154 Miano, Testimony, supra note 57, at 11.
155 Matloff, supra note 70.
156 See Goodsell, supra note 57.
157 Hira, Outsourcing America's Technology, supra note 70.
158 See Matloff, supra note 70.
159 Patrick Thibodeau, Fed Indictments Tell How H-lB Visas Were Used
to Undercut Wages, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 13, 2009, available at
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic
&taxonomyName=Outsourcing&articleld=9127943&taxonomyld=72&pageNu
mber=l
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and investigations hinged on documentation abuse, as employers were
charged with conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, and making a false
statement in an immigration matter.16  Officials initiated these
investigations when they saw "inconsistencies during the application
process."' 6' If the application process had not caught these violations,
employers may have been able to continue underpaying workers and
manipulating the program.' 62 Effectively monitoring post-certification
employer practices might require keeping open lines of communication
between H-18 workers and enforcement agencies and systematically
reviewing the behavior of employers. 1
63
If enforcement agencies do not make strides to change the H-IB
program in order to assure that "the H- lB is not used as a 'cheap labor'
program,"' 16 4 the program will continue to drive down compensation for
American workers who cannot compete with the low wage
requirements of H-lB workers.' 65 Studies have already reflected this
dangerous trend:
According to the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Service's (USCIS) most recent annual report to
Congress, the median wage in FY2005 for new H-lB
computing professionals was $50,000, far below the
median for U.S. computing professionals. The
median wage for new H-iBs is even lower than the
salary an entry-level bachelor's degree graduate
would command.
166
Cheap H-1B labor is very attractive to employers hoping to
profitably complete a project. Stricter enforcement mechanisms are
necessary to prevent the growth of these wage disparities.
C. STRICTER PENALTIES
In order to lessen the disparity between salaries U.S. workers
demand and those paid to H-iB workers, enforcement agencies should
also impose stricter penalties on violators and raise the administrative
costs of hiring H-1B workers. Not only might this cause employers to
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 id.
163 See Hira, Outsourcing America's Technology, supra note 70.
164 Hira, Outsourcing America's Technology, supra note 70, at 3.
165 See Hira, Outsourcing America s Technology, supra note 70.
166 Id. at 4.
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reconsider breaking the rules, but this money could be used to subsidize
corresponding specialty education of U.S. workers. 167 Such a practice
may eventually undercut arguments that the H-I B workers are the only
specialty workers capable of completing the desired tasks.
1 68
Currently, the money received from administrative fines and penalties
is "channeled to the National Science Foundation and the Department
of Labor, primarily for job training programs for U.S. workers, college
scholarships for low income students in engineering, math, computer
science, and certain other science enrichment courses. ' , 169 Due to the
cap on fines, this funding is limited in its "capacity to transfer wealth
created by immigration from employers who benefit from immigrant
workers to U.S. citizens who may be displaced."' 170  Increasing
penalties to augment specialty training for U.S. workers would make
more American workers more appealing to employers.171
Alternatively, H-iB employers could be required to subsidize
training for an American worker for each H-iB hired. 172 Such a rule
could provide that an employer who hires an H-lB worker to complete
a specific project must also set aside a statutorily imposed amount for
the education of current or future U.S. workers so that these workers in
training would eventually match H-iB workers in skill level. In turn,
this education could decrease the chances of H-1B workers
permanently displacing U.S. workers in the event that the H-lBs
become green card-holders. 173 The U.S. workers in training would gain
a competitive advantage and job security while the H-lB worker is able
to complete necessary, immediate tasks. Thus, the government could
assist Americans in coming up to speed with the technologies and
specialty skills fueling the demand for H-IB workers rather than
employers becoming complacent with such skills as within the H-1B
niche. 1
74
As an extension of the increase in penalties, legislation should
also swap the "good faith" requirement for recruiting U.S. workers for
167 See Miano, Testimony, supra note 57.
168 Goodsell, supra note 57, at 155.
169 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REv.
2037, 2080 (2007).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See Miano, Testimony, supra note 57.
173 U.S. GEN. AccoUNIG OFFICE, supra note 75.
17 4 See Miano, Testimony, supra note 57.
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a more workable standard.175 A list of mandatory steps an employer
must undertake for recruiting American workers before considering the
H-lB program would help accomplish this goal. 176 Legislation should
also impose the additional attestations and recruiting requirement on all
H-lB employers, not just H-lB-dependents or willful violators. 7 7 The
Department of Labor currently relies on "education as its primary
method of promoting compliance with the H-iB program," through
"assistance programs and [by posting] guidance on its website. '178
However, updating federal legislation to include specific mandatory
recruitment techniques would create a stronger and more consistent
structure for compliance with recruitment requirements; these updates
could eliminate the problems generated by employers who either fail to
comprehend the extent to which they must recruit U.S. workers or fail
to truly act in good faith. Such legislation could help prevent employer
practices of creating fake job postings or failing to actively recruit U.S.
workers. 179
VIII. CONCLUSION
Current H-1B legislation, although improving, is insufficient to
protect H-1B workers from employers who manipulate the H-1B
system in order to acquire cheap labor. This deficiency causes
American workers to lower their wage standards, when feasible, in
order to remain competitive in the job market. Future legislation
should address these inadequacies and promote greater enforcement of
H-lB rules.
175 Dep't of Labor, Office of Compliance Assistance Policy, supra note
27.
176 Id.
177 See Dep't of Labor, Office of Compliance Assistance Policy, supra
note 27.
178 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
179 IT BusINESs EDGE, supra note 123.
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